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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we are called upon to announce the 
burden of proof that a prisoner must shoulder when he 
alleges that prison officials have retaliated against him for 
exercising his constitutional rights. The plaintiff, Henry 
Rauser, is an inmate serving his eighth year of a five to ten 
year sentence for a drug-related offense. He filed this suit 
in the United States District Court for the W estern District 
of Pennsylvania alleging that the officials at the 
Pennsylvania State Correctional Facility at Camp Hill 
violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom and 
retaliated against him when he insisted on exer cising that 
right. The District Court held that the prison officials had 
violated the Establishment Clause as a matter of law and 
enjoined further violations. However, it dismissed Rauser's 
retaliation claim on summary judgment. Although the 
former decision is not challenged on appeal, Rauser timely 
appealed from the grant of summary judgment on his 
retaliation claim. For the following reasons, we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I. 
 
In 1997, Rauser became eligible for parole. In preparation 
for his parole review, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections ("the DOC") issued a Pr escriptive Program Plan 
for Rauser, which required him to complete a series of 
behavioral programs before the DOC would r ecommend his 
release. Among the programs Rauser was r equired to 
complete were Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") and/or 
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Narcotics Anonymous ("NA"). Both of these programs are 
centered on a belief in a Supreme Being and require 
participants to accept God as a treatment for their 
addictions. 
 
After completing a related religious substance abuse 
program known as the "New Values T en Week Twelve-Step 
Lecture," Rauser objected to continuing in AA/NA on the 
basis of his own religious beliefs. In spite of this objection, 
the DOC refused to consider recommending Rauser for 
parole unless he participated in AA or NA. The DOC did not 
offer Rauser a non-religious alter native to these programs 
until after he filed the complaint in this action. 
 
Rauser alleges that the Department took three actions in 
retaliation for his insistence on religious freedom. First, the 
DOC transferred Rauser from its Corr ectional Facility in 
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, to a facility in Waynesburg, 
Pennsylvania, far from his home and family. When he 
arrived at the Waynesburg facility, the DOC changed 
Rauser's job classification from Class 3, Step D, the highest 
level attainable by an inmate, to Class 1, Step A, the lowest 
possible designation. This reclassification was accompanied 
by a dramatic drop in Rauser's rate of pay, fr om $.41 per 
hour to $.18 per hour. Finally, the DOC r efused to 
recommend Rauser for parole, stating that"this 
recommendation is based on the incompletion of programs 
stipulated in [Rauser's] PPP, i.e.,[the] D[rug] & A[lcohol] 
program." 
 
On September 16, 1998, several months after he r eceived 
a negative parole recommendation, Rauserfiled this 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 action in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania. His complaint alleged 
that the DOC's requirement that he participate in religious 
addition therapy violated the establishment and fr ee 
exercise clauses of the First Amendment. He sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary 
damages for these violations. Rauser also sought 
declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief for the allegedly 
retaliatory transfer and wage reduction. The District Court 
referred Rauser's case to Magistrate Judge Francis X. 
Caiazza (MJ). 
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The defendant prison officials moved to dismiss Rauser's 
complaint for failure to state a claim or , alternatively, for 
summary judgment. Judge Caiazza issued a report 
recommending that the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on Rauser's Free Exercise claim be denied 
because the AA/NA requirement violated the establishment 
clause as a matter of law. The MJ further recommended 
that the defendants be ordered to allow Rauser to decline 
to participate in religious programs and that all entries 
in the DOC's files adversely affecting Rauser's parole 
eligibility based on his refusal to complete such programs 
be expunged. The District Court adopted these 
recommendations, none of which are challenged on appeal. 
 
Judge Caiazza also recommended that the District Court 
grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
Rauser's retaliation claim. The District Court adopted this 
recommendation in an Order dated December 3, 1999, 
holding that Rauser enjoyed no constitutional pr otection 
against retaliation because he possessed no pr otected 
liberty interest in early parole, prison wages, or a specific 
place of confinement. This order is the subject of this 
appeal. We hold that the relevant question is not whether 
Rauser had a protected liberty interest in the privileges he 
was denied, but whether he was denied those privileges in 
retaliation for exercising a constitutional right.1 Because 
Rauser has demonstrated that material questions of fact 
relevant to this inquiry exist, we reverse the order of 
summary judgment and remand this case for trial. 
 
II. 
 
In a recent case entitled Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 
224-25 (3d Cir. 2000), this court held that,"government 
actions, which standing alone do not violate the 
Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if 
motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The prison officials concede on appeal that the District Court failed 
to 
apply the proper legal standard for evaluating constitutional retaliation 
claims. Accordingly, we have concluded that oral argument would not 
materially assist in the resolution of this appeal. We therefore order the 
case submitted without oral argument. 
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individual for the exercise of a constitutional right." 
(quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F .3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 
1999)(en banc)). Accordingly, the law of this circuit is clear 
that a prisoner litigating a retaliation claim need not prove 
that he had an independent liberty interest in the privileges 
he was denied. Our primary purpose in this appeal, 
therefore, is to set forth with specificity the elements of a 
prisoner's cause of action for retaliation and the burden of 
proof he must carry to succeed. 
 
As a threshold matter, a prisoner -plaintiff in a retaliation 
case must prove that the conduct which led to the alleged 
retaliation was constitutionally protected. See Thaddeus-X, 
175 F.3d at 389; Drexel v. V aughn, 1998 WL 151798 at *7 
(E.D.Pa.)(determining that prisoner had engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct befor e proceeding with 
retaliation inquiry). In this case, the District Court 
determined that Rauser's refusal to participate in a 
religious program was protected by the First Amendment. 
This conclusion has not been challenged on appeal. 
 
Next, a prisoner litigating a retaliation claim must show 
that he suffered some "adverse action" at the hands of the 
prison officials. See Allah, 229 F .3d at 225. Under Allah, a 
prisoner-plaintiff satisfies this r equirement by 
demonstrating that the action "was sufficient to deter a 
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
[constitutional] rights." Id. Her e, Rauser has produced 
evidence that he was denied parole, transferr ed to a distant 
prison where his family could not visit him r egularly, and 
penalized financially. The prison officials do not dispute 
this evidence. Accordingly, Rauser has pr esented sufficient 
evidence of adversity to survive summary judgment. 
 
Once these two threshold criteria are met, there remains 
the question of how a prisoner-plaintif f must go about 
proving a causal link between the exercise of his 
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against 
him. This is a question of first impression in this circuit. In 
Mount Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977), the Supreme Court used a burden-shifting 
framework to decide a retaliation case that ar ose in the 
public employment context. The Court held that the 
plaintiff bore the initial burden of proving that his 
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constitutionally protected conduct was "a substantial or 
motivating factor" in the decision to discipline him. See id. 
The burden then shifted to the defendant to pr ove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the 
same disciplinary action even in the absence of the 
protected activity. See id. In this appeal, we join the several 
circuits that have imported the Mount Healthy burden- 
shifting framework into the prison context.2 See Thaddeus- 
X, 175 F.3d at 399; Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 
(2d Cir. 1996); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
 
We recognize that the task of prison administration is 
difficult, and that courts should affor d deference to 
decisions made by prison officials, who possess the 
necessary expertise. In Turner v. Safely , 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987), the Supreme Court held that a prison r egulation 
that impinges on the constitutional rights of an inmate is 
valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests." In adopting the Mount Healthy framework, we do 
not discard the deferential standar d articulated in Turner. 
Rather, we incorporate the balancing test announced in 
Turner into the Mount Healthy bur den-shifting framework. 
This means that, once a prisoner demonstrates that his 
exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the challenged decision, the prison 
officials may still prevail by proving that they would have 
made the same decision absent the protected conduct for 
reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological 
interest. 
 
III. 
 
Applying the standard discussed above to the case before 
us, we conclude that summary judgment was impr oper. In 
determining whether summary judgment is pr oper, the 
court must view the evidence and all justifiable inferences 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. But see Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1993). Cf. Woods v. 
Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 & n.26 (5th Cir . 1995) (citing Mount Healthy 
but stating that the prisoner must establish that but for the retaliatory 
motive the complained of incident would not have occurred); McDonald 
v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir . 1979) (same). 
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to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Rauser has presented a gr eat deal of 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
the prison officials penalized him because he insisted on 
exercising his First Amendment rights. First, Rauser has 
sworn that a DOC official warned him shortly before his 
transfer not to "try and disrupt their alcohol pr ograms" 
with constitutional challenges and threatened that such 
challenges would result in a denial of par ole. Second, the 
DOC acknowledged that its failure to grant Rauser a 
favorable parole recommendation was due to his "failure to 
complete prescribed treatment plans," specifically AA/NA. 
 
Finally, Rauser has demonstrated a suggestive temporal 
proximity between his insistence on his First Amendment 
rights and his transfer and wage reduction. See Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 
2000)(stating that suggestive timing is relevant to causation 
in retaliation case). The District Court noted that Rauser 
first raised his religious objections "prior to January 1998." 
On January 26, 1998, the DOC transferred Rauser to the 
Waynesburg facility and cut his wages by more than half. 
On the eve of that transfer, a DOC official warned Rauser 
that if he continued to disrupt prison programs with 
Constitutional challenges, he would be punished with a 
denial of parole. 
 
IV. 
 
Viewing the evidence as a whole in the light most 
favorable to Rauser, we conclude that a r easonable jury 
could determine that Rauser's protected conduct was a 
motivating factor in the DOC's decision to transfer him, cut 
his wages and deny him parole. The DOC has of fered no 
evidence to suggest that these actions were taken for any 
other reason, penologically legitimate or otherwise. 
Accordingly, the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment will be reversed and the case r emanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to 
be taxed against the appellee. 
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